Copyright protection for the electronic distribution of text documents by Brassil, Jack T. et al.
Copyright Protection for the Electronic
Distribution of Text Documents
JACK T. BRASSIL, SENIOR MEMBER, IEEE, STEVEN LOW,
AND NICHOLAS F. MAXEMCHUK, FELLOW, IEEE
Invited Paper
Each copy of a text document can be made different in a
nearly invisible way by repositioning or modifying the appearance
of different elements of text, i.e., lines, words, or characters. A
unique copy can be registered with its recipient, so that subsequent
unauthorized copies that are retrieved can be traced back to the
original owner.
In this paper we describe and compare several mechanisms for
marking documents and several other mechanisms for decoding the
marks after documents have been subjected to common types of
distortion. The marks are intended to protect documents of limited
value that are owned by individuals who would rather possess a
legal than an illegal copy if they can be distinguished. We will
describe attacks that remove the marks and countermeasures to
those attacks.
An architecture is described for distributing a large number
of copies without burdening the publisher with creating and
transmitting the unique documents. The architecture also allows
the publisher to determine the identity of a recipient who has
illegally redistributed the document, without compromising the
privacy of individuals who are not operating illegally.
Two experimental systems are described. One was used to
distribute an issue of the IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS
IN COMMUNICATIONS, and the second was used to mark copies of
company private memoranda.
Keywords— Computer crime, copyright protection, document
delivery, document marking, electronic publishing, privacy, sub-
liminal channels.
I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright protection is becoming more elusive as com-
puter networks such as the global Internet are increasingly
used to deliver electronic documents. Document distribu-
tion by network offers the promise of reaching vast numbers
of recipients. It also allows information to be tailored and
preprocessed to meet the needs of each recipient. However,
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these same distribution networks represent an enormous
business threat to information providers—the unauthorized
redistribution of copyrighted materials.
Information providers seek to use computer networks
such as the global Internet as a low-cost distribution
medium for documents which they sell in other forms
(e.g., magazines, newsletters, books, CD-ROM’s). But
since copies of digital documents are indistinguishable
from the original, and wide redistribution on networks is
easily accomplished, the threat of information piracy is
real. This threat must be reduced in order for networks to
achieve their potential.
Rather than attempt to prevent unauthorized document
copying and dissemination, we propose technology to dis-
courage it. Our emphasis is strictly on “commercial grade”
document security; we focus on security techniques which
are simple to implement, rather than those that are ex-
tremely resistant to attack. Our security goals are modest;
we hope to make unauthorized copying and dissemination
of electronic publications at least as difficult as if the
publications were distributed on durable media (e.g., paper,
disk). If publishers can easily use computer networks for
document distribution, with no additional fear of revenue
loss due to “bootlegging” than they already face, then we
have achieved our goal.
In this paper we discuss ways to discourage redistribution
of one important class of documents, namely formatted,
black and white text images. Each document recipient (i.e.,
subscriber) receives a document containing a unique set
of marks [1]. Each mark corresponds to an imperceptible
manipulation of the text. We will show that information
hidden in this fashion can be reliably recovered, even from
severely degraded copies.
Adding a unique marking to a document can serve many
purposes. For applications such as copyright protection, the
marks placed in an image can be used as an “identifier” of
the rightful recipient of a document. Through analysis, any
recovered marked document can be associated or “traced”
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Fig. 1. Example of line-shift coding. In the first group of three lines, the middle line has been
shifted down by 1/300 in. To demonstrate this displacement, the three lines are repeated with the
middle line printed both in the unshifted and shifted positions, resulting in its apparent emboldening.
to the original, intended recipient. In addition, personal
information, which a document recipient may be unwilling
to make public (e.g., a telephone or credit card number),
can also be included in an image. Indeed, being aware that
such information can be hidden makes a document more
“valuable” to a recipient. The original recipient is unlikely
to give his credit card number to someone who receives
illegal copies of documents. In addition to discouraging
copying of electronic documents, hidden identifiers can
also used to deter “leaks” of paper copies of closely held
executive correspondence. If an illegal copy of a private
report is found, the original recipient can be identified.
The technology that converts paper documents to elec-
tronic documents is increasing in use and decreasing in
cost. Many companies routinely scan paper documents
into their computer systems where they can be stored,
filed, and retrieved more easily. The cost of facsimile
machines, which convert from paper to electronic form, has
decreased and are used in many homes. Similar advances
have been made in computer printers. In 15 years, printers
have evolved from expensive phototypesetters that required
special paper and resided in computer centers to devices
on home computers that can print in color on almost
anything. Eventually, paper documents will be scanned
and distributed over communications networks almost as
easily as electronic documents. At this point, the threat
of information piracy will be similar for electronic and
paper documents. The techniques that we are developing for
electronic documents will also be needed to protect conven-
tional printed material, such as newspapers or magazines.
This paper explores the technology, systems, applica-
tions, and issues associated with hiding information in
document images. The remainder of the paper is organized
as follows. In Section II we introduce a collection of
techniques for embedding indiscernible marks in formatted
documents. We also discuss techniques for detecting the
presence of these marks in documents, including documents
which have been degraded by “noisy” document reproduc-
tion devices such as copiers and facsimile devices. Marks
that are encoded into the appearance of text may always be
removed by retyping the text. As a partial countermeasure
against this attack we make it unlikely that a mark can
be replaced by another valid mark, so that we can detect
when documents have been modified. Section III describes
the architecture and design of a network distribution system
which addresses the scaling issue in distributing uniquely
marked documents to a large number of recipients. When
publishers register documents with recipients, privacy be-
comes an issue. In Section III we discuss techniques to
protect both the rights of the publishers and the privacy of
the individual. Two experimental document marking sys-
tems that we have implemented are described in Section IV.
II. TEXT MARKING AND DETECTION TECHNIQUES
A mark can be placed in a formatted document by altering
either the appearance or the position of a text element such
as an individual character or word. We say that a collection
of marks within a document forms a code word, and that
the document is encoded. In this section we introduce three
distinct types of marks. Electronic copying does not alter
the marks, but conventional copying techniques degrade the
image and may make the marks unreadable. The challenge
is to find imperceptible text alterations that can be reliably
detected after documents have been printed, photocopied,
or transmitted by facsimile.
A. Marking Techniques
The three marking techniques that we propose illustrate
different approaches rather than form an exhaustive list of
marking techniques. They can be used either separately
or jointly. Each technique enjoys certain advantages or
applicability as we discuss below.
1) Line-Shift Coding: In this approach a mark is embed-
ded on a page by vertically displacing an entire text line, as
in Fig. 1. In a typical implementation, a line is moved up or
down, while the line immediately above or below (or both)
are left unmoved. These unmoved adjacent lines serve as
reference locations in the decoding process.
Most documents are formatted with uniform spacing
(i.e., “leading”) between adjacent lines within a paragraph.
Though the human eye is particularly adept at noticing
deviations from uniformity, our experience suggests that
vertical line displacements of 1/300 in and less go unnoticed
by readers.
The principal advantage of this marking technique is
found in decoding. Since a document’s initial interline spac-
ing is uniform, the presence or absence of a mark can be
detected by analysis of the interline spacing of a recovered
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Fig. 2. Illustration of word-shift encoding. The first line is unshifted; the second line contains four
words, each shifted by 1/150 in. Note that the word spacing in both lines appears natural. The third
line is an overlay of the first two lines.
Fig. 3. Example of character coding. In the first line, the letter
“r” in the word “Internet” had been shifted down by 1/600 in. The
second line reveals the displacement by reprinting the word with
a larger font size.
document, with no need for any additional information
about the original, unmarked document. Therefore, anyone
can read the information. This technique can also be used to
include computer readable information in books or journals
for cataloging and automatic identification.
2) Word-Shift Coding: In this technique a mark is embed-
ded by horizontally shifting the location of a word within a
text line, as shown in Fig. 2. In a typical implementation, a
word is displaced left or right, while the words immediately
adjacent are left unmoved. These unmoved words can then
serve as reference locations in the decoding process.
Formatted documents with justified text typically use
variable spacing between words to distribute white space in
a visually pleasing fashion. Readers accept a wide variation
in text setting within a line; our experience suggests that
horizontal word displacements of 1/150 in and less read-
ily go unnoticed. Since the word spacing in the original
document is not uniform, detecting a word displacement
requires knowledge of the original word spacing. Hence,
the word positions in the unmarked document must be
known in order to extract the hidden information. The
hidden information can only be read by the organization
that owns the original document or its agent.
3) Character Coding: Character coding is a class of tech-
niques which embed a mark by altering a particular feature
of an individual character, as shown in Fig. 3. Examples of
possible feature alterations include a change to an individual
character’s height or its position relative to other characters
(e.g., a “kerning” adjustment). Once again, some character
features are left unchanged to facilitate decoding. For
example, a detection algorithm might compare the height
of a hypothetically altered character with that of another
unmodified instance of the same character elsewhere on
the page.
Imperceptibly embedding a mark by character alteration
often requires extremely careful attention to the context of
the character to be altered. A reader is more likely to notice
a character alteration if an identical, unaltered character is
immediately adjacent. Detecting the presence or absence
of a mark might or might not require information from
the original, unmarked image, depending on the marking
technique and the rule for selecting the characters that are
altered.
4) Comparison: The marking techniques introduced
above alter ever smaller textual elements to embed a mark;
the size of the alterations is similar but the “signal level” is
greater for the large elements. Since the larger text elements
have a larger signal-to-noise ratio when subjected to the
same distortions, we expect line shifting to be the most
robust marking technique. For this reason, line shifting
is particularly well suited to marking documents to be
distributed in paper form, where considerable degradation
can be introduced by photocopying or simply handling.
We expect that word shifting will be less discernible
to the reader than line shifting yet also more difficult to
detect in the presence of noise. Character encoding has
the advantage of a potentially large coding density; on
a given page of text, many more marks can be inserted
by altering characters than by altering lines or words.
This property makes this technique attractive in applica-
tions requiring very wide distribution of uniquely marked
electronic documents (e.g., distributing a large-circulation,
general-interest magazine). The large coding density also
allows redundancy to be added for error correction.
B. Document Marking System
A document marking system comprises an encoder and
a decoder, which we describe in the next two subsections.
The encoder uses one or more of the marking techniques in-
troduced in the previous section to embed a code word in a
document. The decoder analyzes a recovered (and possibly
degraded) document image and extracts the embedded code
word. Henceforth we will limit our discussion to line-shift
and word-shift encoding.
A document can be represented in many forms, such as
an “image” (i.e., bitmap) or in a page description language
such as PostScript.1 Marks can be embedded in a document
taking any form. For the following discussion, we will
assume that we are marking a PostScript document.
1) Encoder: An encoder comprises a document pre-
processor and a word shifter (Fig. 4). The preprocessor
is an off-line, one-time operation which performs two
services.
1PostScript is a trademark of Adobe Systems, Inc.
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Fig. 4. The logical architecture of an encoder.
Fig. 5. The logical architecture of a decoder.
1) The preprocessor replaces arbitrary PostScript com-
mands with a set of equivalent PostScript commands
which are easily recognized and manipulated by the
word shifter.
2) The preprocessor identifies which text words can be
shifted, ensuring good decoding performance with
little perceptual change to the document.
The first step is necessary because different word proces-
sors generate different sequences of PostScript commands
to place characters in the same position on a page. Follow-
ing preprocessing, each text word which is a candidate for
displacement is set at an location on a “virtual page.”
The word shifter modifies the coordinate of a word (for
word-shift encoding) or the coordinate of a text line (for
line-shift encoding). The correspondence between the word
or line displacements and code words is maintained in the
codebook.
2) Decoder: The decoding process is depicted in Fig. 5.
There we assume that a single page of a degraded paper
copy of an encoded document is recovered. The page is
scanned at an 8-bit depth (i.e., grayscale) and standard im-
age processing operations are applied to the image primarily
to reduce noise and prepare the image for further pro-
cessing. These operations typically include edge cropping,
binarization, salt-and-pepper noise reduction, deskewing
(rotation of text lines to the horizontal), and thinning (of
individual characters). The locations of text elements are
extracted from the resulting image. These locations are
then compared with the locations of text within each of
the originally distributed, unique documents. A decoder or
decision algorithm finds the recovered image that matches
one of the original documents most closely and refers to
a codebook to find the identity of the original document
recipient.
C. Image Analysis
The first step in the decoding process is to remove the
noise and distortion that we expect to find in a recovered
image. We begin with a brief discussion of this noise and
its sources.
1) Noise: Document images are often reproduced by de-
vices (e.g., facsimile, plain paper copier) that are effectively
modeled as noisy communication channels. A sample of an
original document and its tenth copy is shown in Fig. 6. In
this section we briefly examine defects these devices impart
on document images and how to create robust watermarks
which can be detected in the presence of these defects.
Expansion or shrinkage of copy size is present to some
degree in nearly every image reproduction device. In some
cases size changes are purposely introduced for perceived
reproduction quality improvement or as an anticounterfeit-
ing measure. The expansion along the length and width of
a page is typically different.
To counter the effect of page size changes, we encode
information differentially and use the relative, rather than
absolute, position of textual objects. We can also encode
information independently along both the width of the page
(i.e., word shifting), and along the length of the page (i.e.,
vertical shifting of text lines).
Defects also occur on relatively large spatial scales (i.e.,
1 cm ). One such phenomenon observed in recursively
copied pages is “baseline waviness” (i.e., text rising above
and/or falling below the logical line on which text sits).
To counter such large-scale spatial defects, our differential
encoding mechanisms use textual objects which are rela-
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 6. Sample of (a) an original text image and (b) its tenth copy.
tively close (e.g., adjacent text words or characters in close
proximity). In addition, a large number of text objects are
left untouched to serve as reference points and to provide
an estimate of distortion to improve the detection.
Many other image defects are readily observed but do not
appear to have a dramatic effect on our detection results
[2]. This includes salt-and-pepper noise, some of which is
easily removed by standard picture-processing techniques.
Linear text line skew (i.e., a tilted line) is approximately
corrected by image rotation. Both edge raggedness (i.e.,
blurring) and fading have surprisingly little consequence in
detection performance. Other researchers have concluded
that blurring tends to be isotropic about each text character
[3]. Because blurring is isotropic, it does not significantly
alter the position of the center of mass or centroid of a text
object, which we use for decoding.
Image distortion is usually more severe in one dimen-
sion—either along the length or the width of a page—than
the other. This is typically the “paper direction,” or the
orientation of paper moving though an image reproduction
device. Variable paper thickness, drums, and wheels out-
of-round, etc., all contribute to nonconstant paper speed
that results in more distortion in the paper direction. Note
that a paper direction along the width of a page will have
more of an adverse affect for word-shift encoding while
a paper direction along the length of a page will have
more of an adverse affect for line-shift encoding. Since a
recovered document may have been reproduced on different
devices with different paper directions, a marking system
should encode the same information along both directions
to increase decoding performance.
2) Profiles: The second step in the decoding is the con-
version of the noise-reduced image to a form from which
text locations can be easily identified. All the detection
methods to be described detect marks by creating and
analyzing a projection profile of a page image. We now
explain what a profile is and discuss how the noise in an
image affects a profile.
Following digitization a page image is represented by a
two-dimensional array with elements
where represents the intensity of the pixel at posi-
tion For a black and white image,
Here, and whose values depend on the scanning
resolution, are the width and length of the image in pixels,
respectively. Each array row corresponds to a horizontal
scan line in the scanned page image. A subimage containing
a single text line is simply the subarray
where and are rows in the image above and below the
text line. For instance, we may take or to be at the
midpoint of the interline spacing above and below the line,
respectively.
A profile is the projection of a two-dimensional array
onto a single dimension. The horizontal profile of the
subarray containing the text line is
i.e., the sum of array elements along each row The
vertical profile of the subarray is
i.e., the sum of array elements along each column
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 7. (a) Horizontal and (b) vertical profile (reduciton = 300
dots-per-in).
Fig. 7 shows a horizontal profile of three text lines, and
a vertical profile of a single text line containing six words.
Note the different scales on the two profiles. A horizontal
profile consists of distinct “columns” and “valleys.” The
“columns” correspond to horizontal scan lines through a
text line, and the “valleys” to interline spaces. The width
of each column in the horizontal profile corresponds to the
“body height” of characters on a text line; this is about 41
pixels at a ten-point font size (i.e., 10/72 in character height)
scanned at 300 pixels/in. The vertical profile of a single text
line has shorter columns and narrower valleys that are much
less pronounced. The height of a column corresponds to a
vertical scan line through a single character, which is no
larger than the font’s body height in pixels.
A profile is an integer-valued vector, though our figures
often depict it as a continuous function, and we often find
it mathematically convenient to approximate it as one. A
profile contains information about the relative locations of
text in an image but is far more convenient to work with
than the image.
Following the removal of noise from a recovered image,
a profile is compiled. We assume that any remaining noise
or distortion that exists in the image, such as translation
and scaling, affects neighboring regions of the image in
a similar fashion. We refer to rectangular image regions as
blocks. We say a block is marked if it contains repositioned
text which serves as a mark; an unmodified block which
serves as a reference is a control block. Control blocks can
be used to estimate structural distortions and the correlation
structure of the remaining noise. These estimates can be
used to remove noise and distortion from marked blocks.
Developing a useful analytical model of each of the many
types of noise that affect a document image would be
challenging. For simplicity, we assume that after we remove
the correlated distortion that is caused by the processes that
we have described, a profile on some interval is
corrupted only by additive noise i.e.,
where are independently identically distributed (i.i.d.)
zero-mean Gaussian random variables. This white Gaussian
noise models all the distortions not accounted for as well
as errors introduced by any compensation we make. A
sample of noise measured from a horizontal and
a vertical profiles is shown in Fig. 8. The corresponding
empirical distributions of are shown in Fig. 9. These
figures suggest that the Gaussian model is a reasonable first
approximation.
D. Detection
The third step in the document decoding process is the
decision (detection) step. Here an algorithm takes as input
the profile of a recovered, marked image, and in some cases
the profile of the original unmarked image. The output of
the detection step is our hypothesis of the code word most
likely embedded in the recovered image.
We begin with some notation. Let be the profile
of an original document page (i.e., unmarked by any
text displacement). Consider the three profile intervals
and , where is the beginning of
the block and is the end of the block. In line-shift
encoding, each block encompasses a text line; in word-shift
encoding, each block encompasses a group of words. The
middle block, is the marked block and the other two
adjacent blocks are the control blocks. We assume that the
profile height between the blocks. We mark the
original image by displacing the line or word corresponding
to the middle block. When the middle block is left shifted
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(a)
(b)
Fig. 8. Sample profile noise measured from (a) a horizontal and (b) a vertical profile.
by the resultant (uncorrupted) profile is where
and
and when the middle block is right shifted the profile is
where
and
An imperceptible text displacement corresponds to a
value of the shift much smaller than the interblock spac-
ing. The profile compiled from the noisy, recovered
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Fig. 9. Corresponding empirical distribution.
copy (after distortion compensation) is
if the middle block is left shifted, and
if it is right shifted. We assume that the noise is
Gaussian with zero mean and variance
Our task is to decide whether the middle block is left or
right shifted given the marked and corrupted profile
Different detection methods use the profiles in different
ways.
1) Feature Detection: Feature or edge detection attempts
to identify the position of a “column” in a profile by
estimating the position of a feature in that column. A typical
feature one might use would be the rising or falling edge of
a column. But by examining the upper profile of Fig. 7, one
observes that while the column edges are not well defined,
there are two prominent peaks. These peaks correspond
to scan lines through the midline and baseline of the text
line; the left peak is caused by horizontal “bars” across the
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middle of characters such as and while the right peak
is the result of character “feet” in a serif font.
We have developed feature detectors which attempt to
locate the position of the text baseline in line-shifted docu-
ments (i.e., baseline detection). In documents with initially
uniform interline spacing, a baseline detector makes a
decision entirely based on the observed profile without
need for the original profile In terms of the above
model, the baseline of block is where the profile peaks
in a neighborhood of the right endpoint of the
interval
The decision rule a baseline detector implements is
simply the following.
a) Baseline detector: Given the observed profile
decide line shifted left, if
decide line shifted right, otherwise.
It is also possible to write a feature-based decision
rule for the case where the original text spacing is not
uniform, as is typical for the spacing between words. Such
a detection rule requires the original document profile, or
more precisely, the location of features within the original
profile.
Feature detection requires the presence of an easily
detectable feature. The absence of such a feature in a profile
leads us to study other detection algorithms.
2) Correlation Detection: A well-known result from
communication theory tells us that a correlation detector
(as might be implemented by a matched filter) optimally
detects signals in the presence of additive white Gaussian
noise. Here we take our received signal to be the recovered
image profile and our transmitted signal to be the
original profile A standard derivation [4, ch. 4] for a
maximum likelihood decision rule yields the following.
a) Correlation detector: Given the observed profile
decide line shifted left,
if
decide line shifted right, otherwise.
Applying this rule is somewhat more involved, since in
practice our received signal suffers from distortions
such as expansion and translation. When these effects
can be accurately estimated and compensated for, we can
reliably detect the direction of shift from the correlation of
and Note that the decision is based only on the
middle block though the probability of detection
error depends on the entire profile and over all
three intervals [5].
3) Centroid Detection: When the effect of translation
cannot be compensated for accurately, correlation detection
often performs poorly. This motivates the centroid detection
method. The observation that a horizontal profile consists of
distinct tall and narrow columns suggests the approximation
of each column by a delta function situated at the column’s
centroid (see Fig. 7). Marking shifts the centroid of the
middle block slightly left or right and leaves the centroids
of the control blocks unchanged. The effect of translation
of the entire text is eliminated by making detection decision
based on the distance of the middle centroid relative to its
two control centroids.
On the original profile the centroid of blocks are
We can model the displacement of the centroids on the
received image profile by the addition of the random
noise component As a result, the control blocks have
centroids
and
The middle block has been shifted by a size so
that its centroid is
if it is left shifted, and
if it is right shifted. Here, are random variables repre-
senting the distortion on the original centroids by the
additive profile noise Since we assume that
is white, the centroid noise variables are
independent. Reference [6] shows that the variables





From (1), the variance of the centroid noise is not
only proportional to the profile noise variance but also
dependent on the original unmarked profile through
and
To eliminate the effect of translation we base our detec-
tion on the distance between adjacent centroids
instead of the absolute position of the middle centroid.
It is convenient to use as decision variable the differences
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of the corrupted centroid separations and the uncorrupted
separations. is the change in the distance of the middle
block from the left control block and is that from the
right control block: without noise and if the
middle block is left shifted, and and if it is
right shifted. Then the centroid detection is the following
decision rule.
a) Centroid detection: Given the observed values
of
decide line shifted left, if
decide line shifted right, otherwise
where and are the centroid noise variances of the left
and right control blocks, respectively, given by (1) and (2).
Even though depends on the profile noise variance
[see (1)], the detection decision does not, since appears
in both and Only the three parameters of
the uncorrupted control blocks are necessary for detection.
The error probability, however, does depend on
4) Comparison of Detection Techniques: Feature detec-
tion is most directly applicable for detecting line shifting,
since the vertical profile of words do not exhibit a
prominent, easy-to-detect feature such as a baseline.
The principle advantage of baseline detection is that it
operates on just the marked copy and, unlike the other
methods, it does not require any information on the original
unmarked document. The disadvantage is its relatively poor
performance on documents that have suffered significant
distortions (see [7, Section III]).
Although centroid detection can in principle be applied
to detect both line and word spacing, its performance in
the presence of noise is satisfactory only for line spacing
(see [6, Section V] for experimental evidence and [5] for a
theoretical explanation). Compared with baseline detection,
it is more reliable but requires centroids of the original
unmarked document profile. Compared with correlation
detection, it eliminates the effect of translation through
differential decoding.
Correlation detection performs much better than centroid
detection on word spacing [5]. However, its performance
is sensitive to how accurately we can compensate for the
translation of the profile. This method requires the profile
of the original unmarked document in order to extract
the encoded information.
The centroids on the original unmarked document can
be treated as a secret (key) that is required for detection.
Without the key the marks can be detected using feature
(baseline) detection, but only from a clean copy. With
the key they can be detected even from a corrupted copy
using centroid detection. There are two methods to decode
the same encoded information in line shifting. This serves
well in a typical scenario where a legitimate document
recipient can easily verify the ownership information from
the received (clean) copy using baseline detection, while a
copyright enforcement agent can reliably extract the identity
of the original recipient even from a corrupted illicit copy
by using centroid detection.
E. Attacks and Countermeasures
Marks placed in a text using any technique discussed
above can be removed by retyping the document, possibly
with the help of character-recognition devices. By contrast,
marks placed in pictures or speech are relatively indelible.
More sophisticated attacks attempt to remove the marks
without retyping the text nor degrading the quality. If the
document is in PostScript format, lines and words are easy
to recognize and can be moved to produce random or uni-
form spacing, while respecting justification. This destroys
the marks placed in line and word spacing. If the document
is in bitmap format, text lines can be accurately recognized
and moved by identifying interline spacing from the docu-
ment profile. The same attack can also be applied to word
spacing, but with less accuracy because of the less promi-
nent valleys and columns in a vertical profile (see Fig. 7).
Despite these attacks, text marking is well suited for
protecting modestly priced documents, such as newspaper
or magazine articles. We assume that if authorized and
unauthorized copies are distinguishable, and authorized
copies are affordable, then most people will not seek out
unauthorized copies.
Countermeasures to reduce the threat of tampering in-
clude:
1) making it more difficult to remove marks;
2) making it more expensive to redistribute a bootleg
copy than the original;
3) making it difficult to forge valid marks.
The distribution mode of a document may make it more
or less difficult to remove marks. Marks are relatively easy
to remove if the document is distributed in a standard
formatting language, such as PostScript, PDF, etc., in which
the location of lines and words are explicitly stated and
easy to change. It is a bit more difficult to remove marks
from a bitmap image, particularly when the text has a
number of different font types and point sizes and is mixed
in with pictures and figures. As documents become more
complicated, automated techniques may require human
intervention. Paper copies must first be scanned into a
bitmap. The scanned bit maps are noisier than bit maps
that have remained in electronic form and are more likely
to require human intervention to decode.
One way to make bootlegged copies more expensive is
to make it necessary for the bootlegger to transmit more
bits than the legitimate publisher. For instance, a publisher
may distribute the text and marks in PostScript, but make
only the (marked) bitmap version accessible to a user (see
below for how this might be achieved). If the bitmap has
100 times as many bits as the Postscript version and it takes
the publisher 15 min to transmit a daily newspaper, then
it will take a bootlegger more than a day to transmit the
same newspaper.
Finally, in many applications the mere ability to rec-
ognize illegal copies, rather than the illegal distributor, is
a sufficient deterrent. If a document recipient removes or
changes the mark, then we cannot determine the original re-
cipient of the document. However, if the mark has not been
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replaced with another valid mark, then we can determine
that the document is not a legally distributed copy. The
stigma attached to being caught with an illegal document
may be sufficient to discourage people from accepting them.
One method that can be used to make it difficult to forge
valid marks is public-key cryptography. In order to use a
public key, the mark must contain both information specific
to the document, such as the title, and the publisher’s
identification number. The document-specific information
prevents an attacker from taking a valid mark from one
document and placing it on another. The publisher signs
the mark with a public key.
In order for signed messages to be secure, they must
be long. Otherwise valid messages may be constructed by
an exhaustive search. Many marked documents will not be
able to encode a large enough number of bits.
A simple method to discourage forging is to select
randomly the code words that are used to identify a
document from a much larger set. For instance, if we can
hide 20 bits in a document, we can construct about 1 million
code words. If there are 100 copies of the document, and
we select the 100 code words that are assigned to valid
recipients at random, then only 1 out 10 000 code words
is being used. If a recipient changes the code word on his
document, there is only 1 chance in 10 000 that he will pick
a code word that has actually been assigned.
III. DOCUMENT DISTRIBUTION
A. Push and Pull Systems
Document distribution systems can be classified as push
or pull systems. In a pull system the client initiates a request
for a transaction. The World Wide Web is a pull system. In
a push system the source initiates the transmission. In the
nonelectronic domain, a publisher who delivers a newspa-
per or magazine to the reader’s home operates in a push
mode. Electronic push systems require a user to be contin-
uously connected to a network, or to be accessible so that
a server in the network can initiate a connection. Sending
electronic mail to users with workstations that are always
turned on and connected to the network is a push system.
Hybrid systems with both push and pull components
are common. A publisher who delivers newspapers to a
newsstand operates in a push mode, while the reader who
visits the newsstand to buy the newspaper operates in the
pull mode. In the electronic domain, when a computer user
receives electronic mail in a mail box that is provided by
an Internet service provider (ISP), the sender operates in a
push mode when the mail is sent and the recipient operates
in a pull mode when the mail is retrieved.
Electronic publishing systems should have components
of both push and pull systems. A new journal article or an
unexpected news story should be sent to subscribers, while
an old article that has been archived should be requested
when it is needed. Electronic publishing can operate in a
push/pull mode by requiring recipients to check a standard
site (newsstand) for new issues of a journal. Our initial
publishing experiments, such as the IEEE JOURNAL ON
SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS (JSAC) experiment
reported in the next section, had to operate in a push/pull
mode because the targeted audience was not completely
identified; those who were known could not be required to
have a continuous presence on the Internet, and the Web
browser software that comprised the client side software
operates in the pull mode.
There are both practical and economic reasons to make
the push mode of operation available for electronic publish-
ing. The practical reason is that most people are accustomed
to having journals and newspapers delivered to them. They
are unlikely to remember to visit a website to retrieve
an infrequently published journal and they are unlikely
to make time in the morning to download newspaper
articles that they are accustomed to reading with breakfast.
The economic reasons depend upon the number of users
that receive an article. A daily newspaper that is read
by several million people at about the same time, on the
same day, is delivered more economically in a push mode.
The publisher broadcasts the article to all of the recipients
rather than transmitting it to each recipient individually as
it is requested. The push mode conserves both network
bandwidth and the processing performed by the publisher.
Journal articles that are archived and are only requested
by a few individuals a month use less network bandwidth
when they operate in a pull mode and are transmitted only
when they are requested.
The current multicast capability of the Internet is
adequate for a push system to send a technical journal to
several tens of thousands of recipients worldwide once a
month. However, a system to deliver a daily newspaper
to several million subscribers in a large city every day
should use a different technology. For instance, the local
cable television network can broadcast the newspaper
during the evening so that it is printed at the subscriber’s
homes before the next morning.
One of the advantages of electronic publishing is the abil-
ity to customize a journal or newspaper to the individual.
Broadcasting the entire newspaper does not preclude
this possibility, it just changes the location of the filter.
In the early proposals, a processor at the publisher
filtered all of the news in order to present the articles that
correspond with an individual’s profile. In the broadcast
system, the news can be filtered by a local, personal
computer. Changes in the price of computing makes the
latter system a viable alternative.
Changes in the price of computer storage may also affect
the way an electronic publishing system is implemented.
Clearly, papers that a recipient is not currently interested
in reading should not be printed on paper. However, with
decreasing disk costs, it may be less expensive for the
recipient to archive his journal subscriptions locally rather
than paying a publisher to store back issues and deliver
individual articles at a later date.
B. Marking
In a pull system a publisher can make each document
that he sends unique. When a publisher serves an individual
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Fig. 10. A document marking distribution system.
client he inserts a mark in the document and registers the
document with the recipient. In the JSAC experiment, when
a user requested a paper copy of an article, we transmitted
a postscript file with a unique mark embedded to identify
the recipient. The processing needed to generate individual
documents was well within the capabilities of our server
since line, and word positions in PostScript are easily
modified parameters; we only generated a few thousand
papers over the course of a month. Processing at the server
does not scale well as the application changes from a
monthly technical journal with a limited readership to a
widely read daily newspaper.
A push system, that uses a broadcast medium to reach
a large number of recipients, distributes identical copies of
the publication. Marking the copy so that every recipient
has a unique copy implies processing the document at the
client. Trusted, platform independent interpreters, such as
JAVA virtual machine [8], were not widely available when
we started the JSAC experiment. JAVA makes it possible
to mark the document at the receiver but also gives the
recipient access to the unmarked document.
In [9] we describe a system that uses client side software
to mark documents without giving the user access to the
unmarked document. In Fig. 10 that system is modified
to use multicast and a push, rather than pull, mode. The
publisher multicasts the same encrypted document to every
recipient. The document is in a reasonably compact form,
such as LaTex. The publisher unicasts each user a decryp-
tion program that contains a unique identification number.
The program decrypts the document, inserts the marks
corresponding to the recipient’s identification number, and
converts the document to a bitmap. If the recipient tries to
redistribute the document, not only is it marked, but the
recipient must transmit more bits than the publisher.
A recipient can avoid transmitting bitmaps, or even
retransmitting the document from the publisher, by giving
away the program that decrypts the document instead of
the document. An unauthorized recipient can receive the
multicast transmission directly from the publisher and use
the bootlegged program to construct the document. This
tactic can be discouraged by requiring personal information
about the original recipient in order to use the program.
For instance, the secret key in the decryption program may
be included in a function with the recipient’s credit card
number. Once again, it is unlikely that a legal recipient
will give his credit card number to anyone who steals
documents.
Programs can be reverse engineered to extract the secret
key and obtain decrypted versions of an unmarked docu-
ment. To reduce the value of doing this work, the publisher
must change the key and program frequently. Depending
upon the value of the documents, the publisher may not
send a new copy of the program with every document but
may use the same key for a period of time. For instance,
if the publisher distributes a daily newspaper, and the
recipients pay by the month, the publisher may elect to
change the secret key and program each month. This has
the added function that recipients that have not paid their
bills automatically stop receiving the newspaper.
C. Privacy
Marking documents and registering the document with
the recipient creates privacy issues, particularly in a pull
system in which the recipient must request each article
that interests him. In this environment, the publisher not
only knows a customer’s magazine subscriptions but also
knows the particular articles that were of interest. It is
especially important to hide this information in a business
environment. In a system that registers an individual’s arti-
cles, a business competitor may not only determine another
company’s employee’s journal subscriptions but may also
determine that a large number of that company’s employees
have suddenly become interested in particular technology.
In future networks with abundant bandwidth, the in-
formation on specific articles can be hidden by having
the recipients request an entire journal and filter out the
unwanted articles. In the present Internet, the time needed to
transmit the requested information is an important consider-
ation. The anonymous credit card [10] provides a means of
hiding the information that an individual received an article
unless the article is redistributed illegally.
The anonymous credit card keeps information on an indi-
vidual’s purchases private by spreading information across
the network. A credit card company must know an individ-
ual’s identity in order to extend credit. A merchant knows
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what his customer is purchasing. However, if the merchant
is convinced that he has been paid, there is no need for the
merchant to know the customer’s identity. Similarly, if the
credit card company is convinced that it has been authorized
to transfer money on an individual’s behalf, it does not need
to know the reason for the funds transfer. Of course, there is
always the possibility that the funds were fraudulently spent
or that the purchase was used illegally. In these instances,
the anonymous credit card provides a means to bring the
information on identity and purchases together.
The anonymous credit card uses a double locked box
protocol. Funds transfers between two specific accounts in
two different banks are performed with the double locked
box protocol and an intermediary. A customer identifies
himself to his bank and presents an encrypted message, the
double locked box, with instructions to transfer funds from
his account to the account specified in the box. The message
can only be decrypted by the intermediary. The bank sends
a funds transfer message to the intermediary, including the
encrypted message from the customer. The bank’s message
is signed and numbered so that the intermediary is certain
that it is from a trusted bank and that it is not a duplicate.
When the intermediary decrypts the message from the
customer it obtains the identity of the destination bank and
another encrypted message, the box within the box, that can
only be decrypted by the destination bank.
The intermediary sends a funds transfer message to
the destination bank, along with the encrypted message.
The message from the intermediary is also signed and
numbered to guarantee that it is from the intermediary
and that it is not a duplicate. When the destination bank
decrypts the enclosed message it learns the account
number to deposit the funds.
Neither bank knows the other bank or the account in
that bank. The intermediary knows both banks but does
not know the account in either bank. In order to link
the source and destination accounts, all three entities must
provide information. The unique message numbers provide
a means of bringing together the information associated
with a particular funds transfer.
The complete anonymous credit card system consists
of several different types of funds transfers for spending
credits and paying debts. In addition to unique messages,
information may be brought together through common in-
formation. For instance, if both banks associate your social
security number with your account, this information can be
used for the receiving bank to learn your identity without
involving the intermediary. In order to determine how many
entities must cooperate in order to join information, a
collusion analysis has been developed that includes all of
the messages and information in a system [11]. According
to the analysis, five separate entities must cooperate in
the complete anonymous credit card in order to join a
person’s identity and purchases. The analysis also shows the
collusion path that specifies the entities and their common
information.
The assumption in the anonymous credit card is that
an organization may be corrupted, no matter how well
intentioned it may be, and a program that implements
a policy may contain a bug, no matter how well tested
it may be. Therefore, the more entities that have to be
compromised to join information, the better the system
preserves privacy. If this were not the case, we could just
find a credit card company that we trust not to release
information.
In the electronic publishing system, privacy is maintained
by having recipients pay for articles or journals with an
anonymous credit card. Instead of associating a marked
article with an individual, the publisher associates the article
with the unique message number that was used to pay for
the article. If unauthorized copies of the article are retrieved,
the publisher obtains a subpoena from a law enforcement
agency and forces the parties involved in the funds transfer
to collude and identify the individual associated with the
message number.
In the document marking context, the ability to determine
a person’s identity when an illegal act has occurred makes it
possible to hide the identity of all of the users who operate
legally. Even when a person has committed an illegal act his
identity is determined without disclosing his entire reading
profile.
The anonymous credit card is not sufficient to guarantee
a distance of five entities between an article and the
recipient’s identity in the electronic publishing system.
The complete system includes a message path to deliver
articles between the publisher and the individual. In the
original analysis of the anonymous credit card an individual
purchases merchandise and carries it away. The delivery
path must be included in the collusion analysis.
If the user is a workstation with a permanent address on
the Internet, the publisher knows the recipients identity. The
collusion distance is one, the publisher. Mail forwarders
[12] have been used to provide anonymity for electronic
mail. The forwarder acts an agent for the recipient. The
publisher sends the article to the forwarder, who sends it
to the recipient. The collusion distance is increased to two.
A series of intermediaries can make the collusion distance
as high as needed.
If the user is connected to the Internet by phoning an
ISP, then the ISP owns the destination address that is used
by the publisher. If the ISP keeps track of which users
are connected to the address, then the collusion distance
is two. The collusion distance increases if the individual
pays the ISP with an anonymous credit card. In this case,
the telephone company is in the collusion path, since it can
identify the individual at the other end of a connection.
If articles are delivered over a CATV network, and a
recipient picks off articles by filtering out all of the articles
that he does not want, then this collusion path for message
delivery is broken. The CATV company only knows that
the article was delivered to one of its customers, without
knowing which one.
Thus far we have adapted the anonymous credit card to
separate a user’s identity from the articles that he receives.
The principles of information separation and collusion
analysis can also be applied directly to electronic publishing
BRASSIL et al.: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION 1193
without using the anonymous credit card. For instance, in
the system that we have proposed, the publisher provides
the program, the article, the decryption keys, and the
marks. In addition, the recipient pays the publisher directly.
Instead, a publisher may sell programs that introduce unique
marks, the keys (or portions of the keys) to decrypt articles,
and credits to purchase articles in bulk, to different retailers.
A person may order a document from the publisher
and pay for it with a credit that he purchased from a
retailer. The received document may be encoded with two
or more keys. (Many encryption procedures commute so
that multiple encodings and decodings can be performed
in any order.) The recipient buys each of the keys, and an
accompanying mark, from different merchants. A merchant
associates a mark with a customer, however, he sells the
same mark to many customers so that it is difficult to
determine a document recipient with only one merchant’s
information. Each merchant sells enough different marks
that it is unlikely that all of vendors from which keys are
purchased will sell the same marks to the same customer.
Therefore, several vendors must collude to associate a
person’s identity and articles.
In order to associate an individual with an article, one
of the parties in the system must know the individual’s
identity. Document marking cannot be used in an electronic
cash system with complete anonymity. A collusion analysis,
in addition to guaranteeing a minimum path length, also
guarantees that there is at least one collusion path. In
electronic publishing, we may want to guarantee that there
is more than one independent collusion path. While it is
important to protect the privacy of legal users, it is also
important to make it difficult for illegal users to hide their
identity. When there are independent collusion paths, a user
cannot hide his identity by compromising a single unit. If
there is only one path, and a user compromises a unit on that
path, the path is broken and the user can hide his identity.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SYSTEMS
We have implemented a number of prototype systems
which use our watermarking techniques to protect docu-
ments. This section discusses the implementation of two
systems which demonstrate the range of different applica-
tions for the technology. In the first system we describe,
electronic documents were distributed to a wide audience
using the global Internet. In the second system, paper
correspondence was distributed among a relatively small
group of individuals.
A. Network Distribution of a Technical Journal
The IEEE Communications Society conducted an ex-
periment using World Wide Web technology to distribute
society technical publications. The trial began with the
publication of the October 1995 issue of JSAC [13], [14].
The trial was an immediate success; over 500 readers
registered with the service before the paper journal arrived
in the first subscriber’s mailbox. More than 2200 readers
eventually registered with the system and have downloaded
articles from that issue. A novel aspect of this trial was the
first use of watermarking technology to protect copyrighted
journal articles distributed on the Internet.
Each registered user requesting the full text of an article
in PostScript format received a uniquely modified version
of the article using the line shifting technique described in
Section II. Many readers of technical articles—particularly
those containing equations—prefer to read printed rather
than displayed documents. Since many distributed articles
would likely be printed, it was decided to use line-shifting
for its robustness, ensuring that the embedded watermark
would survive in printed form.
For a web-based public-access document distribution
system, it was appropriate to watermark each requested
document on a real-time, on-demand basis. Each original
PostScript article to be watermarked required a one-time
(off-line) preprocessing to facilitate encoding. Each system
user was required to register to download articles, at which
time a unique binary code word was assigned to the user.
When a registered user requested an article, this code word
was used as a key to reposition text. Text lines were
repositioned by invoking a Common Gateway Interface
(CGI) script written in both Unix shell and awk languages.
A database record was retained to associate each user with
their code word and requested articles.
Implementing watermarking is, in principle, simple. We
found that watermarking a PostScript document can be
made very fast and consume little computing resources.
We chose not to generate and distribute bitmapped ver-
sions of the watermarked documents. Printable bitmaps
(e.g., PostScript image operator) are ideally distributed to
make documents both printable and moderately difficult to
alter. But distributing images generally lowers presentation
quality, increases the size of files to distribute, and requires
image rendering before distribution. Unfortunately, render-
ing is a CPU-intensive operation, though there are several
system approaches to tackling this obstacle. One approach
is to watermark pre-existing images (i.e., bitmaps) directly,
as would be necessary for distributing documents existing
only in scanned image form. A second alternative is to
“look ahead” by encoding and rendering pages before they
are requested. Rather than inserting a mark that identifies
the recipient when he requests a document, he receives the
next available mark and that mark is registered with him.
In contrast to encoders, implementing a decoder to detect
corrupted watermarks is technically challenging. Highly
reliable decoding performance requires state-of-the-art doc-
ument analysis tools to perform noise reduction, text “zon-
ing,” and word segmentation. Manual intervention by ex-
perts can enhance decoding performance in some cases,
such as when obvious extraneous writing or smudging
appears on a recovered page. Fortunately, decoding is a
relatively infrequent operation without a significant time
constraint.
By creating this prototype document distribution system,
we have demonstrated that our watermarking technique not
only works well but is feasible for large-scale systems.
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B. Registered Correspondence
In order to demonstrate the practicality of our marking
techniques, the first internal memorandum that we wrote
on the topic was marked, using line-shift encoding, and
registered with the recipients. The marks were included by
manually modifying parameters in a postscript file before
printing each copy. We challenged the recipients to locate
the marks and to return copied or faxed versions of the
memorandum for identification. We demonstrated that we
could reliably identify the original recipient of copies with
marks that were not noticeable.
In many business applications there is a need to register
copies of private correspondence. In the past, this has been
done by stamping a serial number or bar code in the margin.
This type of mark not only changes the appearance of the
document but can be covered before making a copy. Our
marking techniques do not compromise the aesthetics of the
document and cannot be covered during copying without
losing the contents of the document.
As a follow up to the JSAC experiment we constructed
a document marking and identification system (DMTS)
for use by secretaries at Bell Labs on an experimental
basis. The system incorporated our refinements in marking
and detection techniques up to that point. The documents
contained duplicate marks in line and word spacing so that
they would survive a wider variety of distortion. A person
who used the system submitted a word processor version of
the document and a list of recipients to the DMTS system.
DMTS generated a PostScript file and modified parameters
to put different marks in each copy that it sent to a printer.
Each copy that was printed was preceded by a cover sheet
with the name of the intended recipient, and the recipient
and mark were entered in a database for future reference.
Because the marks were invisible we appended a footnote
informing recipients that the documents were marked and
registered.
The DMTS system is a reasonable method for creating
small numbers, perhaps tens or hundreds, of registered
copies of documents. Each copy must be sent to a printer
separately. For larger scale applications, like publishing
books, the marking mechanism should be incorporated in
the processor in a mass printer. There are several ways
in which mass printers can be modified to accomplish
this. A straightforward way is to construct a machine
that generates copies from a bitmap that is derived from
a postscript file, an operation that is similar to a single
copy postscript printer. As each copy is printed a few
parameters in the PostScript file are modified and the
bitmap is changed slightly.
V. CONCLUSION
Three techniques have been described for encoding in-
formation into text images: 1) line-shift encoding; 2) word-
shift encoding; and 3) character modification. The three
techniques offer an increasing number of locations for
placing information. However, the techniques with the
greatest number of locations are least able to survive the
distortion introduced by printing, copying, and faxing.
Word-shift and line-shift encoding can be decoded using:
1) the edges of features; 2) the center of mass of features;
or 3) the correlation between the profiles of distorted
image and perfect copies of the various encodings. The
three techniques require increasing amounts of processing.
Correlation decoding is necessary for word-shift encoding
when distortion is present, while centroid decoding is
adequate for line-shift encoding. Decoding based upon
edges or baselines is only appropriate for line-shift encod-
ing in a low-noise environment. The last two decoding
techniques require information from the publisher about
the original positions of the centroids of lines or the
profiles of words. However, because baselines are equally
spaced before encoding, this technique has the unique
characteristic that information can be extracted from a doc-
ument without additional information from the publisher.
Therefore, information can be extracted by anyone, not
only the publisher’s agent. Information encoded in line
spaces may be extracted by both baseline decoding and
centroid decoding, depending upon who is extracting the
information and how much the document is distorted. There
are many instances where a publisher may want to send
information along with the document (i.e., keywords for
cataloguing or signatures for insuring that the electronic
document has not been altered). Since these documents
are likely to have remained in electronic form and do not
have severe distortion, baseline decoding is appropriate for
extracting this information.
Text marks may always be removed by retyping the
document. Automatic techniques that perform character
recognition on noisy bitmaps are continuously improving.
We should expect that this technology will eventually be
able to remove marks. However, removing marks becomes
more difficult and requires more human assistance as doc-
uments become richer and more varied. If a document
is straight text, with a single font and character size,
that is typed in paragraphs across a page, then automatic
resetting, even from a noisy bitmap, should be nearly
perfect. However, when the image is rich in fonts and
character sizes, has Greek letters or equations, and in-
cludes text in figure captions and figures, resetting the text
becomes more complicated and probably requires human
intervention to even locate potential marks. Beyond making
it more difficult to remove marks, we can make it nearly
impossible to substitute one valid mark for another by
randomly selecting the marks that we do use from a much
larger set of possible marks.
Marking documents makes it necessary for the publisher
to create and deliver a different document for every recip-
ient. This is particularly burdensome in applications like
daily newspapers where a large number of copies must
be delivered in a very short period of time. A system
has been developed that uses the multicast facility of the
Internet for delivery and client side software, such as
Java, to individualize the documents. Another problem with
marking is the potential invasion of privacy. The proposed
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system circumvents this problem with the anonymous credit
card. This technology allows the recipients identity to be
hidden from the publisher under normal operation because
the publisher can recover this information if an illegal act
is established.
Document marking has been established as a viable tech-
nology for copyright protection in an electronic publishing
trial. In October 1995, JSAC was delivered over the Web.
There were over 2200 recipients who registered for the
experiment and received selected articles. Every article that
was delivered was marked and registered with the recipient.
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